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Speech by Mr. Brian Tobin, Minister of Fisheries, Canada - January 1995
Ræða Brians Tobin sjávarútvegsráðherra Kanada
á ráðstefnu um langtímanýtingu fiskistofna sem
haldin var á Hótel Sögu
13. janúar 1995
Minister Pálsson, fellow parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen.
First of all, let me say what a great honour and a privilege it is for me to be here, speaking of Canada's experience, and specifically Newfoundland and Labrador's experience, with the collapse of the groundfishery over the last number of years. Let me say to you that I arise to begin this address with a great sense of relief. I was delighted when I noted on the menu that we were having orange roughy, best known as a product around New Zealand, for lunch and not the rough, young Brian Tobin from Newfoundland for lunch. I hope we won't have me for desert, either. During my travels in the last number of days, and in anticipation of coming to Iceland, and I am delighted to be in Iceland and let me say that I had an excellent number of hours of discussion and dialogue with Minister Pálsson last evening in which we had an opportunity to exchange views, to relate experiences, and talk about each other's views of the fishery and to share some knowledge with each other, some views with each other about our respective constituencies and our respective regions. Certainly during that exchange last night and that dialogue last night I acquired an even greater appreciation than I had for the importance of the fishery to the economy, to the people, to the society and coastal communities in Iceland and I want to thank you Minister Pálsson for taking the time to give me that better appreciation and I assure you that I will take it away with me and it will be reflected in Canada's posture and positions and indeed the dialogue amongst ministers as we make decisions in future respecting our joint efforts and joint participation in bodies both international and multilateral in which we work together. So I thank you for your dialogue sir, your discussion.Iceland is an island state and your economy is dominated by the fishery. Canada on the other hand spans a continent, the continent of North America from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, and our national economy in Canada is not dominated by the fisheries. So, at first glance, it could appear that while we have some similarities we are quite different, our two countries. But if you sharpen the focus, sharpen the analysis, the comparison between Iceland and between Canada to coastal Canada, if you sharpen it to the Atlantic region, specifically Newfoundland and Labrador, we have a great deal in common. For five centuries, for five hundred years (This is not a long time in Iceland's calendar. Indeed your parliament first set here I think 1100 years ago) but for five hundred years Newfoundland and Labrador has been like a massive ship, anchored in the Northwest Atlantic in a sea of cod. And I want to report to you that today the ship is still anchored, it is still there but the cod are no longer there. There has been a catastrophic, there is no other word that is appropriate, resource failure that has devastated, that has torn the heart and soul out of an entire coastal society. As I sit here, enjoying the opportunity, the privilege of speaking to you and enjoying the hospitality that you have extended to me, at home 40 thousand fishermen and plantworkers, 300 coastal communities have been displaced, have been torn, it is not pleasant surgery conducted with a scalpel, but devastating surgery conducted with almost a steel fist, they have been torn away from their raison d'être from their very reason for existence. And Canadians have had to ask themselves over the last few years how we ever got ourselves, after 500 years of coastal existence based on the fishery, into such a mess. Whether we as managers, we as the intelligent so-called species, in fact we are not the authors in a very significant measure of our own misfortune. You know mankind instinctively, it doesn't matter where we live, it does not matter what our circumstance when an ill situation befalls us, when great challenges befall us, when catastrophe strikes, mankind instinctively, upon discovering some open wound on the society as a whole, looks around for some villain who caused this wound, some outside force who inflicted this damage, some evil third party who caused us grief. It has taken us some time in Newfoundland and in Canada to recognize that if there is an open wound on our society that the hand that holds the knife that has caused the wound is our own. We in Canada have had to acknowledge that many of our problems, not all, but many, much of the injury, has been self-inflicted.
Let me start with some basic fact about the Atlantic fishery. Commercially Canada has had three types of Atlantic groundfish; cod, flounder and redfish. These are distributed in dozens of fish stocks along thousands of kilometres of Canada's Atlantic coast. There have always been catch failures in one stock or another, this is a part of the cycle of this industry, part of the ordinary fluctuation of the resource. But what has never happened before, what has never been recorded before in the 500 years of history is that cod and flounder and redfish all collapsed almost everywhere and all at the same time. Groundfish stocks today are at the lowest levels ever recorded, key stocks face the possibility of commercial, if not biological, extinction. We have gone from annual catches of almost a million tons to virtually zero in only a few years. Other resources are in far better shape: shellfish, lobster, scallop, shrimp, crab are in relative abundance and pelagic fish stocks, especially herring and mackerel, are plentiful generally as well. In fact, last year, ironically, Canadian exports to the US market went up. Groundfish exports plunged but exports of these other species, especially products from aquaculture as well, have significantly increased and Canada remains a significant player in the seafood markets of the world.
But what has caused the groundfish collapse? Let me be frank and say to you: We are still not entirely sure, cannot give you a thorough and unassailable analysis, but it seems that just about everything that could go wrong did go wrong. Man, by our practices both management and harvesting, processing, man weakened the stocks. Then nature plunged them to frighteningly low levels. Let me begin first with men. First Canada, for many years, consistently overestimated the size of groundfish stocks under the jurisdiction. We set the levels of harvest too high, in some cases far too high. As well, our fishermen engaged in destructive harvesting practices like high grading, discarding. Annual catches were higher than had been reported. I can remember in my own constituency in one case, a member of the mobile gear fleet coming to me some years ago - only a few years ago - and telling me that as much as 50% of the landings of Gulf cod went unreported, that is as much as 50% of the sales of Gulf cod were under the table. The obvious result was that the basis of management of that stock, the basis of scientific analysis of that stock, the basis of total allowable catch of that stock was badly flawed. And flawed because the primary source of information, that of the fishermen themselves, had been grossly and knowingly and repeatedly distorted. And those who participated in that kind of trade, as a way of escaping the constraints of total allowable catch or boat quotas, those who did it, even as they engaged in that practice knew they were cutting, in the absence of a better description, cutting their own throats and brought this to my attention as a Member of Parliament.
I and many others raised these concerns in parliament. Talked publicly about these kind of practices. And the government of the day still hesitated. They thought that if quotas are cut back too far, too fast, then plants that might be saved would have to close. Vessel owners who might be able to make their payments to the banks on their vessels and the significant capacity that exists, overcapacity that exists, then those vessel owners in the light of severe quota restriction, they too might be lost. And that individuals, that people, that communities who could still work would be displaced. Where was the proof, said the government of the day, that plants should close? Where was the proof that vessels ought to be tied up, where was the proof that people should be temporarily displaced from their employment, in the name of conservation? In short, at a critical moment when year over year the stocks decreased, year over year the TACs went down and down and down again, at a critical moment when the government should have intervened to protect the spawning biomass, the Government of Canada played poker. It gambled with the future of the resource in an attempt to save the industry and in the process it nearly lost both for a very long time.
Then there was nature. After men had gambled and lost and weakened the resource, nature plundered it to far lower levels. Cold water temperatures, changes of salinity, ecological factors, some of which and many of which we still don't fully understand, intervened. One example will suffice. In the early 1990s estimates of the total weight of spawning cod in 2J 3KL, otherwise known as Northern cod declined dramatically. By 1992 it was only 25 thousand tons. Compare that to a record high of 1.6 million tons. This represents a decline of Northern cod spawning biomass of 99%. I'll tell, you I can recall well, visiting parts of my own constituency and sitting on the wharf with perhaps a plant manager, a couple of large-vessel operators, some small-boat operators - of course, the small-boat operators and the large-boat operators seldom agree on everything - but the one thing they all agreed, the plant manager, the large-boat operator, the small-boat operator, the one thing they all agreed, was that the scientist didn't know what he was talking about. I can remember the kind of comments: "That I'd gone out just yesterday and I sailed in waters I have been sailing in for 25 years and we had the best haul, the biggest fish we've ever seen. How can they say the stocks have declined?" Of course this would not sound familiar to you. And: "I have been fishing in these waters for 35 years and these scientists are all foolish. They ought to have rocks tied to their ankles and pushed over the wharf." That would not sound familiar either, of course. "And there's plenty of fish out there my son. The biggest kind. The best landings we've had in years." And I would listen to this endless debate and, whatever the rationale and whatever the way in which the managers were described, at the bottom line was one thing: that everybody wanted to survive this season, everybody had an eye on this year, everybody had an eye on this quota, at this time, and nobody had their eyes on the next generation. And I tell you, now I can go back to those communities, communities like Port au Choix on the great northern peninsula, where FPI, Fisheries Products International, National Sea, you recall Mr. Chair, I'm sure, Victor Young or Henry Demone, people who like you have had the responsibility for large operations, are no longer present. FPI, a company with a large trawler fleet, which now supplies itself with Barents Sea cod, with aquaculture product out of China or Asia, has now become a manager of, commodity trader, in fish food. It does not harvest and does limited processing. But I can go back to those communities and where once there was vigour and debate, and great fights, and entertaining discussion, about the foolishness of the managers and of the scientists, there is now a eerie calm, there is a kind of quiet desperation. In a room like this one, with several hundred people as quiet as you are, listening as attentively as you are. Where here in the eyes of the people I speak to I see some animation, some interest in the subject at hand, some questions perhaps being reflected in the faces that I look at, there I see a kind of dull today, a kind of flat expression in my own constituency. There is no anticipation, there are no great questions, there is no thirst and enthusiasm and appetite for tomorrow, there is fear. There is fear because communities that for 500 years were founded solely and only on the basis of the fishery, that had existed only for one reason, the fishery. Communities that has neither forest product, nor mining product, nor oil, nor gas, nor agricultural land, communities that are carved out of rock on the edge of the Atlantic Ocean and who exist only for fish, have found their entire raison d'être gone.
And it's a pretty frightening experience. So now in Canada we live with the collapse, we live with the calamity, that is undeniable. A fishery that is closed. A fishery where, of the 35 major stocks in the Atlantic region, 17 are under moratorium. A fishery where the conservation ethic has changed dramatically, where every voice that called for gambling with the resource now calls for caution with the resource.
A month and a half ago in the Province of Quebec, in a small community called Mont Jolie, in the Quebec fishing area, I went to announce the 1995 groundfish management plan. And in Canada we have a process called the FRCC (the Fisheries Resource Conservation Council). And the FRCC, made up of scientists and fishermen and processors, all work together, examine the (this has only been in place for a few years, it is new in Canada, we should have had it 20 years ago) scientific evidence, with all of the stakeholders around the same table, make recommendations publicly to the minister. I receive their advice by a way of a press conference, so nothing is confidential, what they recommend is seen by everybody. And this year they recommended e.g., and I want to say this as a reflection of how our attitude has changed in Canada, they recommended a redfish or perch, ocean perch fishery as you would call it, in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, with the quota of 7500 metric tons in Unit 1, one management zone, and 24000 tons in Unit 2, another management zone. I want to tell you what the Minister did. That was the public advice. In the case of Unit 1 I closed the fishery - entirely, no fishery. Because the Unit 1 stock has gone from 60 000 metric tons only a few years ago to 30 000 metric tons, to 20 000 metric tons last years and a recommended catch of 7500 this year. Those 7500 metric tons are the difference between life and death for many mobile gear operators and many plants barely hanging on. I closed that fishery in the area most affected by that decision and at
the end of the press conference those present applauded. Not a single voice was raised in objection. People saw a free-fall occurring and understood that if we make deep cuts now, the kind of cuts we never had the courage to make before, and intercept that free-fall, rebuild the stock or we lose it again, possibly forever. So there is a new ethic, but one dearly paid for in Canada. Now in Canada we have the goal of protecting the few fish that are left. We must develop a level of conservation in which there is no tolerance, zero tolerance, for Canadians that breach conservation rules. For most stocks now, the groundfish stocks, the only catches are in sentinel, or test, fisheries, scientists and fishermen working shoulder to shoulder, which is a pleasant change from the days when they stood nose to nose in opposition to each other. Now they work side by side, one learning from the other. The sentinel fisheries keep alive an invaluable source of information, the direct experience of fishermen, to supplement ongoing scientific work and indeed fishermen were not always listened to when they should have been in the past. I don't believe there is a country in the world today that has imposed upon itself - granted not voluntarily, it came reluctantly and at a great cost - that has imposed upon itself such dislocation of its people, its industry, such expenditure of its shrinking tax base, in order to try and rebuild a fishery.
From all of this we have learnt a very bitter, but I think an important and simple lesson, in economics in the fishing industry. And it is this: Protecting the resource can hurt a little if you start early, it can hurt a lot if you start late.
You know the role of Minister of Fisheries is not an easy one. Ministers of Fisheries around the world have always been saddled with the responsibility, or have had the responsibility thrust upon them, to be the voice in government of the fishing industry. The voice that speaks and gives rise to the concerns of fishermen, the concerns of boat captains, the concerns of processors, the concerns of plantworkers. This has been traditionally, or ought to have been in the mind of all of us who lived in coastal communities, coastal societies, the role of the Minister of Fisheries. And every time there is a problem at plant, a processing company, that is trying to make its five-year business plan work, cover the cost of its expansion or new investment work, the processing company or the industry sees the minister and says: "Minister, we have to make our investment plan work and we need more fish to cover the cost of the investment we've made". The same is true of boat owners who have invested in new technology, greater capacity at much greater cost that has to be paid for. And how is it paid for? With fish. The same with fishermen, coastal societies, constantly putting pressure on the Minister to provide more fish. And the only capital of a Minister, the only way to respond to any of the problems that are raised, is for the Minister to pull out his symbolic wallet and to spend fish. Fish. The instant cure, the instant medication, for each and every problem in the industry. And every voice around the table is heard except one voice. The voice of the fish. And I say to you, that I believe that Ministers of Fisheries are going to have to try, against the backdrop of pressure on stocks all over the world, to reverse their role. I say to you that I have come to the conclusion, I can only speak for myself and for Canada, that a Minister of Fisheries cannot manage a fishing fleet. At least I can't. A Minister of Fisheries cannot manage a processing sector. At least I can't. A Minister of Fisheries cannot be the master and the organizer and the coordinator of coastal communities' macro- of micro-economics. At least I can't. But the one thing that a Minister of Fisheries might be able to do, might be successful at, is managing the resource. And if the resource is properly managed and sustained the rest, that is the health of the industry, will follow. Understanding the ecology of the resource will take time. But in the meantime Canada will maintain the moratoria for threatened groundfish stocks. And we will also pursue solutions to our problems, through unilateral means where that becomes necessary, but preferably through multilateral talks and organizations. One such example of where these solutions may be found is through the process now underway at the United Nations. Let me say that, before I comment on the UN conference, that because we have experienced such a crisis in Canada we understand the need to reduce the overcapacity and to restructure the way in which the fishery is conducted in our country.
This morning I had an opportunity to visit with the plant of the Chairman of the conference, Grandi, with Minister Pálsson and with other member of the visiting Canadian delegation. Let me say to you very clearly that Canada seeks from Iceland the advice, the demonstrated expertise, the experience that you have had in developing what is clearly and what is acknowledged worldwide as the most efficient industry in the world today. Efficient both in terms of your harvesting sector, your processing sector, and in your management capability. I asked the Minister of Fisheries today how many employees he had and when he told me how few he had, in their role in working in co-operation with the industry, I asked him if I could borrow one or two, just to clean up Canada's fishing mess. And I want to say to you genuinely and sincerely that I hope we will have the opportunity, both I as Minister and our officials, to come back, to spend more time with you for the purpose of learning from you how to make a more efficient industry in Canada. We see the collapse as a tragedy, yes, but also as an opportunity, a time to restructure our industry, a time to reduce our capacity and this is a major goal for the Government of Canada. Today there is not one nickel, as I was pleased to tell the chairman of the conference, not five cents in subsidy, being offered to the processing sector in Canada. There is none on the part of the Federal Government. There were government guaranteed loans by the provincial governments but those have been withdrawn and the market place now will determine which plant shall survive or not, and it is the market place that will determine which ones are efficient or not. With respect to fishermen we have offered a programme of assistance that amounts at maximum to less than $400 a week, a training allowance to assist up to 50% of the total number of those affected by the groundfish collapse to retrain in regular training institutions, retrain for the purpose of permanently leaving a sector that cannot sustain them now, and even if and when there is some rebuilding, cannot sustain
them in the future. The overcapacity that existed prior to the collapse must disappear and our capacity to harvest and process must come into line with our resource capacity. These are tough measures, unpleasant decisions, but they are being taken and I can tell you they are being supported by both fishermen's unions, processors' associations and provincial governments.
Up to this point I have focused on what Canada has done or more importantly, what we failed to do, to conserve groundfish stocks. As I said earlier, most of our problems were of our own making, but not all of the problems were of our own making. For some stocks that straddle the 200 mile limit Canada has faced what I would call a deliberate and sustained onslaught of straddling stocks. As you know, NAFO is the body that manages conservation of straddling stocks off Canada's Atlantic coast. Canada and Iceland were founding members of this organization in 1978. From the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, a critical period for these straddling stocks, Canada argued consistently at NAFO for a conservation-minded approach in NAFO. The European Union, by contrast, argued consistently for higher quotas. When the Union didn't get higher quotas from NAFO, and it frequently did not get higher quotas, NAFO as an agency functioned and supported the concept of conservation, the European Union used the objection procedure, a component of NAFO, and unilaterally set its own quotas - and then it failed to control its own vessels, and often catches exceeded even the unilateral quotas that had been set by the European Union. The result of all of that was tragic. Stocks collapsed. Beyond 200 miles overfishing by vessels flying, in particular Spanish and Portuguese flags, and flags of convenience like that of Panama, continued to fish even after moratoria was called for and even after the indications of collapse were profound. By a bitter twist of fate, the most favourable ecological conditions in recent years have been in the deeper waters outside the 200 mile limit. And where groundfish should have been in the healthiest condition, because of uncontrolled overfishing, in fact the ground fish that had access to the best environmental condition were the most threatened. Hence the collapse of Northern cod and in more recent years the evidence of collapse of Greenland halibut.
I am disappointed to say that the overfishing, in my mind deliberate overfishing, by Spanish and by Portuguese vessels has not ended. While NAFO decisions have become more conservation-oriented the conduct of these fleets have not. As fishing opportunities have gone down, NAFO violations by Spanish and Portuguese vessels have gone up. The rules for fisheries management and conservation have changed but the practices, of some fleets but in particular these two fleets, have not changed. In 1994, the year just completed, Spanish and Portuguese catches of 3M cod were more than double, more than double, the EU quota. And in a two-week period in October half the Portuguese vessels misreported cod catches and one-quarter of the Spanish vessels misreported flounder catches. In the area of NAFO citations provided for in the NAFO agreement there has been nearly a 40% increase in citations in 1994 over 1993. One Spanish vessel received four such citations for using under-sized mesh and harvesting species under moratoria, but the vessel continued to fish. And that is why a few days ago in Brussels I met with the outgoing EU fisheries commissioner. I talked to the incoming EU commissioner, I talked to Sir Leon Brittan about this problem and I have said clearly, clearly, that the time has come for the EU to ensure that vessels that fly under its flag practice conservation rules. That for Canada the need to get this problem under control is so pressing that we shall see it solved wherever it occurs, we shall solve it by unilateral action, if necessary, but by agreement, preferably, where possible. And that is why in the last year Canada has e.g. passed legislation dealing with the problem of flag of convenience vessels. That legislation came into force last May and I am pleased to report that since the legislation came into force not a single flag of convenience vessel has shown up on the nose or tail of the Grand Banks. So let me say that that action is inspired by the determination and the commitment of Iceland, in recent years and historically, to protect and defend and to manage a resource that is vital to its national life. We took the action - it has worked. Last year we arrested a vessel flying the Panamanian flag 228 miles out, registered in Canada, crewed out of Portugal, the Christina Logos and it's a lesson, a frightening lesson, to go aboard the hold of that boat and to see thousands of pounds of cod no bigger than the palm of my hand. The redfish looked like they belonged in a little tank in somebody's home, a fish tank, like guppies, the cod, tiny little species, 105 tons, and all of it undersized, almost none of it bigger than the palm of my hand. And that is not with one-liners but with two.
This kind of wanton destruction, this kind of fishing practice, in 1994 and 1995, at a time when stocks in all the major fisheries of the world are in decline. This kind of high grading to meet the financial expectation now rather than being worried about the capacity to sustain the fishery for later, this must stop. This is criminal. Criminal activity, not just in the legal sense but in the moral sense of the word. And Canada is determined that it shall stop and we haven't just taken measures that have challenged smaller countries or countries that are further away. Last year Canada arrested two American vessels beyond the 200-mile limit, vessels that were fishing, interestingly enough, for Icelandic scallop. According to the Law of the Sea, sedentary species are the responsibility of the coastal state. We told the Americans as much. The Americans told us we were wrong. They were going fishing. We told them if they went fishing they were coming to visit Canada's port. They did not believe us. They went fishing. We send a welcoming party, consisting of a DND vessel, a fisheries vessel, armed. We seized those boats, we took them into a Canadian port and the US ambassador showed up 24 hours later with a nice letter for me. I get a lot of letters from ambassadors lately. The letter said: "You have 24 hours to release these vessels or else". If you imagination is as fertile as mine, of course, this is a very frightening thing. We did not release the vessels. We pressed charges. And last month the US ambassador came back with a second letter. And the second letter said: "The United States recognizes Canada's jurisdiction to manage Icelandic scallops".
So we have not just been provocative when it is easy to be provocative. Last summer, for those of you who follow the trials of the Pacific salmon, you will know that we forced 300 American vessels out of Washington and Oregon, plying the waters to Alaska, to pay a Canadian license fee. Because these vessels were unilaterally fishing Canadian salmon stocks outside of the conditions of the Pacific salmon treaty. Three hundred vessels. One American senator said they should send in the Coast Guard. A second one said they should send in the Marines. This was not an easy action. But we took it, we collected the license fee and last week a new US negotiator and the Canadian negotiator began anew the talks that should lead to a negotiated settlement of our differences.
So we have taken some measures inspired by the example that you yourselves have given: that when an important national resource is at stake one must behave responsibly, one must stand up and be counted on some days.
Now Canada doesn't want to have legislation that allows us to go after flag-of-convenience vessels. Canada does not want to take any action unilaterally anywhere, inside, outside, but in particular outside the 200-mile limit. Canada wants to be part of a multilateral international solution of the problem of managing straddling stocks and highly migratory species, wants to be part of a set of rules, binding rules, effective rules, with enforcement capability, to protect the rights both of coastal states and of distant waters fishing states. And Canada has worked with Iceland in close partnership at the United Nations to achieve such a set of rules and indeed, as recently as this morning, we again had a discussion of views of Iceland vs. Canada, and how we can work together to ensure that we go to the next session, March 27 in New York, with identical language to achieve shared purposes. And I will work very hard Minister Pálsson to ensure that our voices are as one at that conference, bearing in mind the special interest and the special position of Iceland as a nation that has a dependence on the resources of the ocean in greater measure than perhaps any other nation in the world. We shall bear this in mind as you so eloquently pointed out this morning.
So let me conclude my remarks, because I already have talked for too long, by saying to you that I recognize there are no lessons that Canada - none - can give to Iceland. There is no wisdom that I, as a Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, can bring to Iceland. This country has demonstrated because of its disproportionate dependence on the fishery that its level of expertise, its level of knowledge, its capability for hard work, its ability to innovate, to change and to compete and to win. And in markets around the world it is second to none in the world, there are no lessons I can bring, there are many that I can with your co-operation take away from this place.
The only lesson I do want to bring is to tell you not to do what we have done. Not to fail to make the hard decisions when you still have the chance to make them. Not to fail to understand that the desire to save a job today may destroy an industry tomorrow. You have managed for so long your resource in your own interest in your own way. I respect that. But I tell you as one who comes from a coastal society, I come from Newfoundland and Labrador, my forefathers came to Newfoundland and Labrador as immigrants from Ireland, who sat on the beach and put fish on the flakes and salted fish, the first job of any Tobin in Canada. Settled in a little place called Red Island, a small island off the island. A place where everybody else was a mainlander and the only true blue good citizen of the planet was an islander. I understand that feeling that comes from living in a small community, living on an island. I understand the fantastic attachment to the sea and to the land, how valuable it is. But I want to tell you it is tenuous. I want to tell you, if you doubt in your mind at all, if you can not believe that it is possible for man to destroy the living resource of resource of the ocean you need not have a new scientific experiment. There is a laboratory, filled with guinea pigs, in a place called Newfoundland and we have proven we can defeat the ocean, we can destroy the living resources of the sea if we don't have the courage to take the tough conservation decisions today.
Now I know that Icelanders are more courageous than Newfoundlanders and I know you will take the tough conservation decisions required to sustain your leading place as a fisheries nation of the world.
Thank you for inviting me.
Allar frekari upplýsingar er að finna á vef Alþingis